China’s purge of senior military leaders may have affected its war-fighting readiness, but diplomats and analysts say it is likely to have strengthened President Xi Jinping’s control over an institution that is a key source of power for the ruling Communist Party.
Regional military attaches and security analysts are closely watching the crackdown as China continues efforts to modernise its armed forces and increases deployments around Taiwan and disputed areas of the South and East China Seas.
Senior military leaders expelled
The latest development came this week when the ruling Politburo expelled two senior military leaders, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, from the Communist Party and the military.
Zhang, the son of a close friend of Xi’s father, had long been regarded as Xi’s closest military ally. He served as Xi’s deputy on the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s top defence command body.
Analysts say dozens of second-line officers have since taken key positions in the CMC, theatre commands and individual military services. However, five positions remain vacant on the commission’s seven-member ruling committee.
China’s defence ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Singapore-based Chinese security scholar James Char said Xi’s position had been further strengthened by the removal of proteges of Zhang and Miao Hua, who previously served as the military’s top uniformed political officer.
Char said Xi could be expected to maintain decisive control and influence over China’s military affairs and, by extension, the party-state.
Purges raise questions over combat readiness
Xi has led an extensive campaign against corruption and indiscipline since coming to power in 2012.
The campaign has seen millions of people across China’s vast bureaucracy investigated to varying degrees, while scores of senior party, government and military officials have also been investigated and purged.
Tian Shichen, president of the Chinese think tank Global Governance Institution and a former defence ministry official, said removing corrupt elements would strengthen the political foundation, cohesion and overall combat effectiveness of the armed forces.
Investigations into Zhang and Liu were first announced in January, although formal punishments have yet to be disclosed.
The extensive replacement of senior military personnel means China has maintained its current defence posture, including weapons tests and increasingly complex military exercises.
However, questions remain over the impact of the purges on China’s ability to conduct warfare, particularly in relation to Taiwan.
Zhang was the most senior Chinese military officer with actual combat experience, having served in the brief but bloody border war with Vietnam in 1979, the last time China engaged in real fighting.
China analyst Ruby Osman said it was difficult to imagine upheaval on such a scale without creating problems for more complex military operations, including a full-scale Taiwan contingency.
She said the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had nevertheless insulated routine operations from the turmoil.
Osman, a senior policy adviser on China at the London-based Tony Blair Institute, said Xi appeared to view short-term disruption as a price worth paying for long-term discipline and combat readiness.
Political control remains central
The crackdown initially focused on corruption, including aspects of procurement involving the PLA’s elite Rocket Force, which controls China’s conventional and nuclear-armed missiles.
Increasingly, however, the campaign has taken on a political dimension. Some analysts see this as a reminder that the PLA exists primarily to serve the Communist Party rather than the nation.
Tian said the PLA’s fundamental principle had always been the absolute leadership of the Communist Party over the military. He rejected foreign views that Xi’s personal power had simply been concentrated.
The official PLA Daily said Zhang and Liu had made serious contributions to political and corruption problems that undermined the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and endangered its governing foundation.
The newspaper also said their actions had caused significant damage to the military’s political development, political environment and combat effectiveness.
Char, of Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said he did not expect the CMC’s top panel to be fully staffed until the Communist Party’s full congress late next year.
Xi is widely expected to secure a fourth five-year term at the congress, a prospect that analysts say could contribute to an intensified focus on internal security.
The continued vacancies could also hamper engagement between China’s military and foreign armed forces, which diplomats regard as important as regional tensions persist.
Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun remains in office, but he is neither a member of the ruling Politburo nor the CMC and is considered less powerful than many of his international counterparts.
Zhang’s meeting with then-US national security adviser Jake Sullivan in Beijing in 2024 was viewed at the time as a breakthrough in US-China military relations. It remains unclear who will replace him.
In the meantime, Xi may be making some decisions himself, said Bonnie Glaser of the Washington-based German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Glaser, who heads the organisation’s Indo-Pacific Program, said the PLA could still carry out orders through the joint staff, theatre commands, military services and party apparatus.
