Taiwan could face growing geopolitical pressure from China without a full-scale military conflict, with Southeast Asia potentially feeling the economic and strategic consequences long before a war begins, writes Rizal Hamdan.
Hamdan, a Senior Program Officer at Merdeka Centre, writes about geopolitics and foreign affairs for RIMAU Geopolitical Insight on Substack. The views expressed here are his own.
Recent activity by the People’s Republic of China east of Taiwan suggests Beijing is expanding its pressure on Taipei. In August 2026, a Chinese fishing vessel believed to be part of a maritime militia operated alongside a Chinese Coast Guard vessel and a research ship near Taiwan’s eastern coast. Chinese Coast Guard activity in the area has also increased since June 2026.
For years, the Taiwan question has centred on the possibility of China launching a full-scale military operation to achieve what Beijing describes as reunification. However, the more immediate danger for Southeast Asia may lie in actions that fall short of war.
This does not mean a blockade is imminent. The more important question, Hamdan argues, is which Chinese capabilities Beijing is gradually normalising.
From maritime presence to control
Taiwan’s eastern coastline faces the Pacific and is strategically important for maintaining external access during a geopolitical crisis. A persistent Chinese presence in these waters could strengthen Beijing’s ability to surround, monitor and potentially isolate the island without immediately resorting to conventional military force.
The escalation could unfold incrementally, through expanding Coast Guard patrols, maritime militia operations and increasingly persistent surveillance. Beijing could eventually seek to impose inspection or regulatory authority over vessels approaching Taiwan.
The crucial transition is from establishing a presence to asserting jurisdiction.
A Chinese naval vessel preventing a commercial ship from reaching Taiwan would clearly constitute military coercion. However, if a Coast Guard vessel claimed the authority to inspect the same ship, the situation would become more ambiguous.
Through grey-zone tactics, Beijing could frame such actions as law enforcement rather than warfare, complicating the responses of Taiwan, the United States and other governments.
For Southeast Asia, this approach is already familiar.
China has long combined Coast Guard vessels and maritime militias in the South China Sea. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative estimated that an average of 241 Chinese militia vessels were present daily across monitored South China Sea features in 2025.
Similar militia vessels have supported Chinese activities around contested areas involving the Philippines and elsewhere in the Spratly Islands.
Taiwan could therefore face a method that Southeast Asian governments have already experienced: establishing a presence, making it routine and gradually reinforcing claims of authority over contested waters.
Why a Taiwan crisis matters to ASEAN
The implications extend beyond maritime security. Taiwan is central to regional technology and manufacturing networks, making any disruption potentially costly for Southeast Asian economies.
In 2025, Singapore’s bilateral trade with Taiwan reached US$53.4 billion, while Taiwan-Vietnam trade totalled US$32.5 billion and Taiwan-Thailand trade amounted to US$19.4 billion.
Taiwan also supplied 47.9% of Thailand’s integrated circuit imports, while Malaysia-Taiwan trade reached RM233 billion.
A crisis involving Taiwan would therefore not remain confined to the island.
Even a temporary quarantine could disrupt semiconductor deliveries, increase shipping and insurance costs, delay electronics production and prompt companies to build larger inventories.
Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines would face different levels of exposure, but all are connected to regional manufacturing networks in which Taiwanese technology, companies and components play significant roles.
The Philippines faces additional vulnerabilities because northern Luzon lies close to Taiwan and the Bashi Channel, placing the country near any confrontation involving Chinese and American forces.
Manila’s alliance with Washington would make crisis management particularly sensitive, even if the Philippines were not directly involved in hostilities.
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, meanwhile, maintain varying security relationships with Washington while remaining deeply connected to China. Their instinct would be to avoid choosing sides while protecting trade and economic stability.
However, this balancing act would become more difficult if a quarantine forced governments to decide whether Chinese inspection demands constituted legitimate law enforcement or coercion against international navigation.
What Southeast Asian governments should watch
Hamdan argues that Southeast Asian governments should not assess the risks surrounding Taiwan solely through aircraft sorties or predictions of an invasion.
More practical indicators include persistent Chinese Coast Guard patrols east of Taiwan, repeated maritime militia deployments, coordinated Coast Guard and naval operations, and attempts to impose inspection, navigation or regulatory requirements on commercial vessels.
This does not require Southeast Asian governments to abandon their One China policies or take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. Preparing for a disruption is not the same as choosing sides.
The more important warning is that the region could be affected long before a war begins. Geopolitical tensions will put Southeast Asian governments under pressure to interpret and respond to the actions of major powers.
The central question is whether Beijing will create a new maritime reality around the region. Actions once regarded as coercive could become routine, with repeated behaviour gradually acquiring the appearance of legitimate authority.
Strategic change does not always come through war or territorial seizure. It can also advance through repeated presence, administrative claims and the steady narrowing of another actor’s choices.
For ASEAN, the risk is that by the time the first volley is fired, the status quo may have already changed.
