China’s long-held assumption that a war over Taiwan could be won through a rapid, decisive campaign may deserve closer scrutiny, according to Julia Curlee in a Lawfare analysis.
Curlee argues that Beijing’s preferred approach would be a swift operation aimed at decapitating Taiwan’s leadership, paralysing its command structure and capturing the island before the United States and its allies could intervene. However, she says recent conflicts suggest such expectations may be overly optimistic.
Decapitation alone may not decide the outcome
Drawing on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the 2026 conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran, Curlee argues that eliminating senior leaders does not necessarily end a war. In both cases, political authority and military command continued functioning despite leadership losses, allowing resistance to continue.
According to the analysis, this raises questions about whether the People’s Liberation Army can rely on leadership strikes as the foundation of a Taiwan campaign. While Beijing may continue pursuing attacks on Taiwan’s political leadership, communications and command systems, Curlee believes such strikes alone may not guarantee a rapid collapse of the island’s defence.
Low-cost defences could complicate an invasion
Curlee also argues that recent wars demonstrate how relatively inexpensive defensive weapons can impose significant costs on a stronger military.
She points to Iran’s use of drones, anti-ship missiles, naval mines and fast attack boats in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as Ukraine’s use of asymmetric weapons against Russia’s naval forces. In her view, similar capabilities could make any amphibious crossing of the Taiwan Strait far more difficult than military planners expect.
The analysis suggests Beijing may respond by expanding blockade capabilities while investing further in mine-clearing, counter-drone systems and measures designed to neutralise Taiwan’s mobile missile launchers before they disperse.
Endurance may matter more than speed
Curlee contends that the greatest danger for Beijing lies in a conflict that fails to end quickly. Once an invasion turns into a prolonged war, she argues, the advantage increasingly shifts to the side better prepared to endure.
Although China has spent years strengthening its military capabilities and building strategic reserves, the analysis says a lengthy conflict would still expose its economic and strategic vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s objective would not necessarily be outright victory, but maintaining resistance long enough for outside assistance to become meaningful.
Curlee concludes that Taiwan should continue strengthening government continuity plans, redundant command structures and mobile defensive systems capable of surviving an opening strike. She argues that preparing for both a short conflict and a prolonged one will be essential if Taiwan hopes to sustain its defence.
